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Abstract

An explanation facility is an important component of an expert system, but current systems
for the most part have neglected the importance of tailoring a system's explanations t o the
user. This paper explores the role of user modelling in generating expert system explanations,
making the claim that individualized user models are essential t o produce good explanations
when the system users vary in their knowledge of the domain, or in their goals, plans, and
preferences. To make this argument, a characterization of explanation, and good explanation is
made, leading t o a presentation of how knowledge about the user affects the various aspects of
a good explanation. Individualized user models are not only important, it is pratical to obtain
them. A method for acquiring a model of the user's beliefs implicitly by "eavesdropping" on the
interaction between user and system is presented, along with examples of how this information
can be used to tailor an explanation.
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1 INTRODUCTION

1

Introduction

A distinctive feature of expert systems is the explicit representation of the reasoning and domain
knowledge they use, enabling them t o provide an explanation for the conclusions they reach. Unlike
other decision systems, where the answer or recommendation is often presented without support,
expert systems allow the user t o explore the reasoning process that lead to the conclusion. In fact,
explanation capabilities are frequently the most significant benefit provided by an expert system.
This paper examines the role of explanation in expert systems, and why user models are important t o the generation of good explanations. The thesis is essentially this: when producing an
explanation, a system makes assumptions about the knowledge of the user; if the system is designed
t o interact with a range of users whose domain knowledge varies, then explicit user models will be
necessary, in order t o generate good explanations. Furthermore, it is feasible to acquire such models
as a user communicates with the system, and the models acquired in this way will be sufficient to
tailor expert system explanations t o individual users so that they will find the explanations more
understandable.
The path taken t o substantiate this thesis is somewhat long, occupying the body of the paper. First, the importance of an explanation facility for expert systems is discussed in section 2,
arguing that the essential role of explanation in many expert systems justifies efforts t o improve
their explaining capabilities. Unfortunately, our understanding of explanation and the process of
explaining within the Artificial Intelligence community is primarily intuitive. To provide a more
solid basis for talking about explanation, material from the Philosophy of Science discussing explanations and their quality, augmented with a discussion of computational issues, is presented in
sections 3 and 4. At this point, the need for knowledge about the user in producing good explanations will be evident. Section 5 considers the points in explanation generation where a user model
is important, and how knowledge of the user's beliefs about the domain and reasoning knowledge
of the system can influence explanations produced.
The role of user models in explanation generation is merely an academic exercise if such models
cannot be acquired practically. Section 6 summarizes our work on acquiring knowledge of the user's
beliefs about the system's domain and reasoning knowledge-knowledge used in the explanation
generation process. These user model acquisition techniques build a user model implicitly, by
"eavesdropping" on the interaction between system and user. Furthermore, the techniques are
domain independent, enabling a general user modelling facility that can be used effectively in a
range of systems with minimal customization. Section 7 illustrates how the acquisition rules acquire
a model of the user's beliefs from a dialogue between the system and a user, and how these beliefs
can be used to tailor an explanation so it is more understandable, with an extended example of a
hypothetical investment advisory system.

2

The Importance of Explanation

An important feature of expert systems is their ability t o explain their own reasoning. In summarizing a survey of physician's expectations and demands for computer-based consultation systems
(reported in [36]) Buchanan and Shortliffe note:

. . . a program's

ability t o give explanations for its reasoning was judged to be the single
most important requirement for an advice-giving system in medicine." [5, p. 6031
Weiner states that knowledge-based systems ". . .include some mechanism for giving explanations,
since their credibility depends on the user's ability t o follow their reasoning, thereby verifying that
an answer is correct." [41, p. 191. Explanation is thus a crucial feature of expert systems.

2

THE IMPORTANCE OF EXPLANATION

2.1

Why Explanation is Important

An explanation capability is important in an expert system for several reasons. The most common
reason is the one noted by Weiner above: explanations are needed to justify a recommendation.
An explanation can increase user acceptance of a recommendation by providing assurance that
the recommendation is logical, or it can persuade a user that an unexpected recommendation is
appropriate [39].
Explanations also help the user t o recognize the limitations of an expert system. Neches,
Swartout, and Moore [24, 251 have noted that system recommendations can confuse users who are
unsure of the scope of system capabilities. An explanation facility enables the user to explore the
system's reasoning t o determine whether the system considered all the relevant facts, and reasoned
with them appropriately.
Explanation can be an important aid t o expert system development and maintenance, by providing a history of the reasoning steps taken by the system. MYCIN's explanation facility originated
in commands to aid in debugging rules [5, p. 331-3321. Neches, Swartout, and Moore [24, 251 have
exploited the relationship between explainability and maintainability in their Explainable Expert
Systems (EES) approach, using declarative knowledge representations and an automatic program
writer t o produce systems that have good explanation facilities and are more maintainable than
traditional expert systems.
Finally, an explanation facility can enable an expert system to instruct users about the system's
domain. The GUIDON project [ll, 101 exploited MYCIN's explanation capabilities t o build an
intelligent tutoring system for medical diagnosis. Even in conventional expert systems, an explanation capability may allow the system to provide a user with information he did not know, such
as defining concepts relevant t o the domain, as the CLEAR system does [31].
2.2

How Explanation Can Be Improved

Research on improving explanation has focused on two approaches: extending the range of possible explanations that an expert system can provide, and improving the quality of explanations
produced. Conventional expert system explanations are limited t o providing a description of the
steps the system took in reaching a conclusions. For example, when MYCIN requests a piece of
information, the user is allowed t o type "WHY?" (interpreted to mean "How is this information
useful?"), causing the system t o produce an explanation based on the rule this goal appears in, and
the goal the rule concludes about [9]. Such systems are capable of explaining what they did, but
cannot justify those actions [34].
Clancey [9] and Swartout [34] have considered ways to extend the range of explanations an
expert system can produce. Each has discovered that t o produce explanations that address the
intentions behind the system's actions, the strategic knowledge used by the system to reason about
the domain must be separated from definitional and causal knowledge about the domain.
The second research issue, improving the quality of explanations produced, is the focus of this
paper. Early work in this area includes the translation of formal proofs into English [8] and Weiner's
BLAH system [41], which focused on how to organize and focus the information in an explanation.
Wallis and Shortliffe [39], Sleeman [33], McKeown [21], and Paris [26] have presented methods for
tailoring explanations according to user knowledge. The common emphasis of this approach is
a focus on deciding what information an explanation should include, and how that information
should be presented to benefit the user most.
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What is an Explanation?

Since this paper focuses on explanation, and particularly on how t o produce quality explanations,
it is important t o have a firm basis for discussion. Unfortunately, in expert systems research
explanations are usually considered as simply the response an expert system makes to a "why?"
question. Such a view is inadequate. Explaining is a type of human communication, one that expert
systems are intended t o mimic in their responses. Thus, it is important t o characterize explanation
and the explaining act. This section briefly discusses types of explanations, then presents a formal
description of explanation and explaining taken from the Philosophy of Science. This analysis
of explanation will serve as a basis for the following section, where the characteristics of good
explanations are considered.

3.1

Types of Explanations

Explanations can take many forms, depending on the type of information they communicate. Perhaps the most familiar type of explanation is scientific explanation, where an argument is given t o
support a specific conclusion. Such arguments make take the form of deductive proofs from certain
or uncertain premises (labeled deductive-nomologicaI and deductive-statistical explanations respectively by Hempel [15]). Other types of scientific explanations may argue inductively (inductivestatistical explanations), or argue from the relation of a particular theory t o the observed world
(statistical-relevance explanations) [32].
Although the scientific style of explanation is the most obvious type of explanation, there
are many others as well. Descriptions of objects or processes are often used to explain, such as
explaining how to send an electronic mail message by describing the sequence of steps required
t o accomplish the action, or describing a telephone to explain how it works. In other cases, the
explanation may take the form of an argument, but without the strict reasoning methods of a
scientific argument, such as arguments that rely on analogy, examples, or an appeal t o an authority.
Although current expert systems tend t o give scientific-style explanations, any form of explanation may be appropriate. Since an explanation is used t o communicate information t o the user,
systems should use the type of explanation that is most likely t o be successful. In some cases, this
may mean that the use of analogy or example is more appropriate than a complex scientific explanation. For example, the analogy between water flow and electricity is often used when explaining
electrical properties. In other cases, the system may need to describe objects or processes in the
domain, rather than argue about them. Thus, expert system explanations can, and should, take
on a variety of forms depending on the explaining situation. A good explanation facility must be
able t o decide which form of explanation is most appropriate for a given situation.

3.2

Explaining

Having a typology of explanations is useful for understanding the range of circumstances where
explanations might appear, and the range of behaviors that might be labeled "explaining." A
typology is not sufficient, however, t o enable one t o point and say "That is an explanation!," or
"That can't be an explanation!" Such a capability requires a specification of what conditions
are necessary and sufficient for identifying an explanation. This section reformulates the issue
of identifying explanations by first claiming that explanations are products of explaining actions.
Furthermore, explaining is an illocutionary action [3], hence necessary and sufficient conditions for
explaining must account for its illocutionary nature. These conditions are presented, along with
further characteristics of explanation and explaining.

3 WHAT IS AN EXPLANATION?
E x p l a n a t ion is t h e P r o d u c t of Explaining
The concept of explanation is closely tied to the phenomenon of understanding, in that explanations
aid the hearer's understanding of that which is being explained. However, everything that aids
understanding is not an explanation. Suppose a person observes a billiard game, and by this
observation comes to understand Newton's laws of motion-the billiard game did not explain
Newton's laws of motion, rather, it happened to aid in a particular understanding event. On
the other hand, having the form of an explanation (such as a logical argument form) does not
make a statement an explanation-it may be wrong or universally misunderstood. Thus, although
explanation involves understanding, there is more to it-the explanation must be presented us an
explanation. In other words, an explanation is the result of an explaining action.
Explaining is an illocutionary action 131, an action performed with a particular intention in mind.
Other types of illocutionary acts include warning, commanding, or promising.1 To demonstrate
this, consider a situation where a person, while reading the warning sign "Flammable Liquid:
No Smoking" comes t o realize that an exposed flame can cause a flammable Liquid to explode.
Certainly, the warning sign cannot be considered t o explain the fact that exposed flames can cause
flammable liquids to explode, because the sign was never intended to be an explanation. Thus, not
only should a statement contribute to understanding to be considered an explanation, it should
also be produced with the intention that it explain. Hence, explaining actions are illocutionary

action^.^
C o n d i t i o n s for Explaining
Achinstein, in his book "The Nature of Explanation" [I]has presented a formal account of explaining, explanation, and what it means to be a good explanation, stating three necessary and sufficient
conditions for a speaker S to explain "why p" to a hearer H by uttering a statement u expressing
the proposition e.3
1. Intentionality: S utters u with the intention that H understand "why p."

2. Correctness: S believes that e is a correct answer to the question "Why p?"

3. Instrumentality: S utters u with the intention that u will produce the knowledge of "why p"
in H.
The intentionality condition captures the illocutionary nature of explaining,
while the correctness
condition specifies that the speaker believes what he say is a correct answer. The instrumentality
requirement is necessary to ensure that telling the hearer how to acquire the answer t o "Why p?"
(such as telling him where to look for the answer) does not count as the explanation of "why p."
It is enlightening to consider two features that are not necessary conditions for an explainingact. First, it is not necessary that the hearer recognize the explaining act. For example, H may
not be listening when S utters u. The act is still the same, whether H realizes it or not, so it seems
appropriate to omit H 7 srealization of the act as a requirement for explaining. Similarly, explaining
is not a perlocutionary act. If explaining were a perlocutionary act, an additional condition,
lIllocutionary acts are distinguished from locutionary acts, such as simple utterances, and from perlocutionary
acts, which include the effects of the action on other agents. Thus commanding someone to stop is an illocutionary
act. The actual statement "Stop!" is a locutionary act, while causing the person t o stop is a perlocutionary act.
2Another reasonable possibility is t o consider explanations t o be perlocutionary acts. This issue will be discussed
in the next section.
3This definition is taken from [ I , pp. 16-18], but notation has been significantly changed, and in some cases
technical aspects of the definition have been omitted.
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concerning the effect of the explanation on the hearer, would be needed, such as the requirement
that the hearer understand the explanation. Such a requirement would eliminate the possibility for
failures when the speaker produces an explanation, but the hearer fails to understand.
An explanation is simply the product of an explaining act. More precisely, an explanation can
be represented as an ordered pair consisting of a proposition and an act-type, so an explanation
answering the question "Why p?" will be the pair " ( e , explaining p)."

3.3

Understanding

An important point left open in the conditions for explaining is the meaning of the term "understand." Achinstein devotes a significant portion of his book to an often technical discussion of
understanding, arriving at three conditions that define understanding.
The first condition is simple: for an agent t o understand that e explains "why p," he must
believe that e is a correct answer to the question.
Second, one does not understand "why p" in isolation, but rather in a certain way. In fact, an
agent may know an explanation for why p is the case, but ask "Why p?" t o learn an explanation
of another sort. Thus, understanding an explanation includes the recognition that e provides a
particular kind of answer t o "Why P ? . " ~
The last condition for understanding is the most difficult. It is not sufficient t o know a proposition that serves as an answer t o "Why p?," understanding also involves some notion of the relation
between the answer and the question. For example, the classification of explanations in section 3.1
presents many types of relations between e and p. Just as one can explain q by analogy with p,
an agent can understand q by analogy with p. Thus, the final condition for understanding is that
an appropriate relation exists between e and "why p." This relation is summarized in Achinstein7s
notion of a content-giving proposition, a proposition that can be used with respect to "why p."

3.4

Contrast Classes
W h e n Willy Sutton was in prison, a priest who was trying to reform him asked h i m why
he robbed banks. ('Well," Sutton replied, '(that's where the money is." [13, p. 211

A further requirement for explanation has been noted by Garfinkel [13] and van Fraassen [37].
They observe that p, the event or situation being explained, is always distinguished from some set
of alternatives, which they call p's contrast class. Van Fraassen claims this contrast class is an
implicit part of any why-question. For example, in the anecdote above, the question "Why do you
rob banks" could have several contrast classes, such as
Why do you rob banks? (That's where the money is.)
Why do you r o b banks? (I don't like to work.)
Why do you rob banks? (Because my wife won't.)
and so on. The contrast class may be explicitly stated in a why-question, but it is usually implied
by the context of the question and the current focus of the conversation. In either case, the question
"Why p?" has an associated contrast class integral to the question. Thus, the task of explaining
consists not simply of selecting an answer t o present, but in selecting an answer from the correct
contrast class, while denying that other members of the contrast class are a correct answer to the
question.
4Achinstein formalizes this point by introducing the notion of instructions as constraints on an explanation-any
explanation for "why p" must also satisfy some set of instructions I.
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This notion of a contrast class is lacking in most current expert systems. Systems that explain
by reciting the history of what rules where used do not keep track of alternatives, thus, they cannot
argue why one sequence of rules was followed instead of another. However, Swartout's XPLAIN
[34] and EES systems [35]do address this issue t o some degree, in that the alternative methods for
reaching a solution are recorded, allowing explanations of why one method was used rather than
another.

3.5

Explaining and Justifying

Achinstein, Garfinkel, and van Fraassen are concerned only with characterizing scientific explanation, while the range of expert system explanations is not so limited. Thus, it is appropriate
t o distinguish two related activities that up to now have been lumped together under the term
"explaining." Explaining will be used in the sense defined by Achinstein: having the intention to
produce knowledge in the hearer. On the other hand, justifying is weaker than explaining, only
intending t o affect the beliefs of the hearer. Explanations and justifications are the result of explaining and justifying acts, respectively. Explanation deal with things that are true, while justifications
are concerned with things that may not be true.
Fortunately, Achinstein's conditions for explanation can be applied t o justifications as well, by
relaxing the understandablity and correctness requirements. When explaining, S believes that he
is giving a correct answer t o "Why p?," while in justifying, S only believes his answer supports or is
evidence for "why p." Likewise, in explaining, S intends H to know "why p," while in justifying S
only intends that H accept e as support for why p. Formally, the necessary and sufficient conditions
for performing a justifying act are the following.
1. Intentionality: S utters u with the intention that H accept e as support for "why p."
2. Correctness: S believes that e supports "why p."

3. Instrumentality: S utters u with the intention that e be accepted as support for "why p" by
H.

In summary, explanation must be understood as the product of the illocutionary act of explaining. An explanation answers a why question, whether the question is explicit or implicit. In
explaining, the speaker believes his statement answers the question "why p" (the question being
explained), and intends that the hearer understand "why p" through his statement. Moreover,
the question "why p?" must be considered in the context in which it is asked. An explanation
answers a why question with respect t o the space of possibilities associated (usually implicitly) with
the question. In practical situations, a user model will be useful in producing an explanation by
helping a system t o determine what question the user is asking (or might ask), and what range of
possibilities he considers to be potential answers.

4

What Makes an Explanation Good?

Characterizing explanations and explaining is not sufficient t o enable one t o begin building explanation facilities for expert systems. Although precise conditions for explaining have been presented,
the space of possible explanations satisfying those conditions for any given question may still be
quite large. An explanation generator must consider how to chose among the valid explanations
possible, hence it requires some way of determining the quality of those explanations.

4

WHAT MAKES A N EXPLANATION GOOD?

9

Just as section 3 examined the characteristics of (and conditions for being) an explanation,
here, the features of good explanations are analyzed. Unfortunately, Achinstein resorts t o vague
terms such as "interesting" and "valuable" t o characterize good explanations, terms that are as
hard t o characterize as "good." Thus, our discussion of explanation quality must go beyond Achinstein's treatment t o identify specific characteristics of explanation quality that can be used t o guide
explanation generation.
A starting point for this analysis is Austin's communicative acts. In section 3, explaining was
described as an illocutionary action-solely in terms of the speaker's intent. This characterization
was necessary t o account for the fact that explanations may vary in quality. When considering
an explanation's quality, however, the expected perlocutionary effect of the explanation must be
considered as well. This does not mean that the quality of an explanation depends on its actual
success-an explanation can still be considered good, even if the hearer does not attend t o it.
Rather, the quality of an explanation should depend on how successful the explanation is expected
t o be, given its context.
This section presents three criteria for evaluating the quality of an explanation. Two (relevancy,
and convincingness) affect the content of the explanation, while the third (understanding) primarily
affects how that content is communicated.

4.1

Relevant Explanations

The first requirement of a good explanation is that it be relevant to the hearer's needs. To some
degree this is covered by the requirements of explanation itself: to explain "why p?" the speaker
must respond with respect to the implicit contrast class of the question. Thus, a question that
expects an intentional answer cannot be explained by a causal answer. However, the relevance of a
response goes beyond simply answering the question. Often agents have higher goals they wish t o
accomplish, obtaining a particular explanation may be a small step in achieving those goals. An
explanation will be more relevant if it addresses the hearer's higher goals in addition t o answering
the immediate question.
Satisfying the user's goals is at the root of Achinstein's inclusion of "interest" and "value" as
requirements for good explanation. An explanation is interesting if it addresses the user's goals in
seeking the explanation, and valuable if it contributes t o the accomplishment of those goals.
Producing relevant explanations is one aspect of cooperative behavior, described by Grice in
his maxims of cooperativity [14]. Grice7smaxims have been used extensively to guide research in
the generation of cooperative responses, particularly in question answering systems. Two of these
maxims have bearing on the relevance of explanations. The first, the maxim of relation, simply
states "be relevant." This maxim summarizes the point made in this section, a relevant explanation
is one that addresses the hearer's current goals. The second maxim, the maxim of quantity, goes
a step further. The maxim of quantity says "Make your contribution as informative as necessary,
but not more so." This maxim expresses the requirement that not only should a good explanation
be relevant to the hearer's goals, it should address those goals as fully as possible. Furthermore,
a good explanation will not include extraneous, irrelevant information that might be confusing t o
the hearer.
The relevancy criteria for good explanation affects the content of the explanation: what information is actually intended to be understood by the hearer after hearing the explanation. For
an expert system, much of this information selection depends on the perceived goals of the user.
This provides a partial method of evaluating the quality of explanations, in that one explanation is
better than another if it enables the user t o accomplish his task more quickly or with less effort. In
producing good explanations, therefore, an expert system must attempt to maximize the likelihood
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that the explanation it gives will satisfy the goals of the user.

4.2

Convincing Justifications

A justification presents an argument for belief, but the hearer may refuse to accept that argument.
Thus, not only must good justifications be relevant and understandable, they should convince the
user to believe what is being justified.
The convincingness of a justification depends on two things: the soundness of the justification
itself, and the extent t o which the hearer finds the justification acceptable. The soundness criterion
affects the argument itself: a deductive argument is stronger than an inductive one, highly certain
inferences are better than questionable ones, and scientific justifications are better than analogies
or examples. In addition, for an argument to be convincing, the hearer must accept its premises
and reasoning steps. Thus, it is better to argue based on facts the hearer believes, rather than
facts the hearer is uncertain about, or does not believe at all. Likewise, a particular hearer may
consider analogies to be perfectly acceptable arguments, meaning that an analogy from strong
premises could be a more convincing justification for that hearer than a deductive argument from
weak premises.
The convincingness criteria also affects the content of an explanation, since it helps determine
what form of explanation to give, and what facts or arguments to include in that explanation.

4.3

Understandable Explanations

Not only must an explanation be relevant to the user, he must find it understandable. As with
relevance, in order to produce good explanations, an expert system must strive t o maximize the
likelihood that the user indeed understands the explanation. Five features affect the understandability of an explanation: the first four (appropriateness, economy, organization, and familiarity)
are concerned wih features of the explanation itself, while the fifth (processing requirements) considers understandability in terms of the effort on the part of the hearer. In fact, the processing
required of a hearer t o understand an explanation seems to be a primary criteria for judging the
understandability of an explanation.
To be understood, a speaker must select a type of explanation the hearer is
likely to understand. For example, in explaining how a light switch controls a light, one might give
a physical-causal explanation, an analogy to water flow, or simply describe a sequence of events;
depending on the knowledge the listener had of electricity. Paris, in studying the types of descriptions given by encyclopedias for children versus those for adults [26], discovered that significantly
different forms of explanation are used for persons with different degrees of knowledge: for novices
the explanations tend t o be process-oriented, while for knowledgeable persons the explanations will
tend to describe an object in terms of its properties, its parts, and things it is a part of. Thus, the
kind of explanation appropriate for a user is dependent on his level of knowledge.
Appropriateness

Webber and Joshi [40] state that justifications from a knowledge base should be succinct. A succinct justification (or explanation) is one that does not provide more information than
is necessary, and that provides this information with a minimum of words. Thus, with other things
being equal, a short explanation is better than a long one.
Economy

Organization The organization of an explanation also affects its understandability: simple explanations are more likely t o be understood than complex ones, and explanations that highlight
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points of interest t o the user will be more successful. Weiner [41] identified several organizational
features affecting the complexity of an explanation, including: the amount the of detail used, the
grouping of information, and the presence of structural information in the explanation. These
issues have also been addressed by McKeown in organizing output in the TEXT system [20]. A
well-organized explanation avoids large amounts of detail, collects related information together,
and gives clues to help the user understand its structure.
Familiarity Another issue is the familiarity to the hearer of the content of the explanation. An
explanation is more likely to be understood if it is expressed using terms the hearer is familiar with.
Familiarity also affects the succinctness and complexity of an explanation, because unfamiliar terms
or concepts will need t o be explained for the hearer to understand the explanation. Thus, the use
of unfamiliar terms in an explanation causes an explanation to be longer and more complex. On
the other hand, if the hearer is familiar with portions of an explanation, they can be omitted. This
happens frequently in logical deduction explanations, where reasoning steps are left out because
the hearer is presumed to know them, and how they apply to the explanation.
Processing R e q u i r e m e n t s An issue that encompasses the features described above is the processing requimd on the part of the hearer to understand an explanation. These processing requirements can be divided into two categories: the amount of work the hearer must do to comprehend
the explanation itself, and the amount of work required to infer the information the speaker intended to communicate by the e ~ p l a n a t i o n .The
~ issues of economy, organization, and familiarity
affect the processing required of the hearer by determining the relative amount of work the hearer
must do to comprehend the explaining statement, versus the work to infer the speaker's intended
information. For example, an explanation may be well-structured and succinct, requiring very little
work for the hearer to comprehend it, but the explanation may be indirect, causing the hearer to
make further inferences to understand what the speaker was trying to communicate.
Processing requirements are important feature of explanation because they provide a single
measure for understandability of explanations: explanations that require more processing to understand are more prone to be misunderstood. Thus, an expert system should seek t o minimize
the anticipated processing requirements of the user. Such a measure is attractive because it captures the intuition that a complete explanation, even though it is cooperative and correct, is not
necessarily better than a short explanation that still addresses the user's goals.
To produce a good explanation or justification, issues of cooperativity, argumentation, and
understandability must be addressed. The response must address the user's goals and preferences,
be argued convincingly, and expressed in a manner that is likely to communicate the intended
information. As discussed in the next section, explanation capabilities in each of these areas can be
enhanced by the use of knowledge about the user. Section 6 will discuss techniques for acquiring
some of this knowledge, and the use of this knowledge to enhance t o determine the familiarity
criteria of understandability is illustrated with examples in section 7.

5

The Need for User Models in Generating Explanations

Having explored the nature of explanation and good explanation, this section will argue that user
models are needed to produce good explanations, and indicate how knowledge about the user can
5Ringle and Bruce [30] draw this distinction in their discussion of conversation failure. They call a failure t o
comprehend what is said an input failure, while a failure t o assimulate t h e intended meaning of t h e statement is a
model failure.
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be used to improve explanations according to the criteria presented in section 4. First, however, a
definition for the term "user model" is needed.

5.1

User Models

Providing a precise definition of what constitutes a user model is not easy to do. As a basis for
discussion, we will adopt a definition proposed by Wahlster and Kobsa [38] that states:

A user model is a knowledge source in a natural-language dialog system which contains
explicit assumptions on all aspects of the user that may be relevant for the dialog
behavior of the system.
The knowledge a user model keeps about a user may be quite varied, including assumptions about
the user's goals, plans, preferences and attitudes, capabilities, and knowledge or beliefs [la]. User
models also vary in their generality: a system might maintain individualized models for every user
it encounters, with specific assumptions about each user's goals, preferences, beliefs, and so on; or
the system might keep a generic user model that it applies to all users of the system. Generic user
models often are not explicitly represented, but implicit in the design of the system as a whole. In
fact, any system that interacts with the user can be said to have an implicit user model, if only by
virtue of the assumptions the system builder made about the user while designing the system.
5.2

Why User Models are Needed

The discussion in sections 3 and 4 has provided a basis for understanding the role of user models
in generating explanations. User models are not needed to generate explanations per se, since
explaining is simply an illocutionary act-it is possible to provide an explanation without considering the hearer at all. However, to produce a good explanation the speaker must consider the
likely perlocutionary effect of the explanation on the hearer: will the explanation be relevant to
the hearer's goals?, is it likely to convince him of the point being justified?, and is he likely to
understand it? To answer these questions, the speaker must reason about the hearer beliefs, goals,
plans, and preferences.
Still, an expert system explanation component may not require an explicit user model to produce
good explanations. If the anticipated class of system users is homogeneous in the beliefs and
intentions of its members, an explanation component can be designed to produce good explanations
for this class of individuals.
Frequently, though, the anticipated system users will vary in their knowledge and goals. For
example, intelligent help systems, intelligent tutoring systems, or domains such as investment
advising will have users who vary greatly in their knowledge of the system domain. In this case,
to produce good explanations for all users, the explanation component will need to tailor the
explanations it produces-based on the model it has of the user's beliefs, goals, and plans. Thus,
to produce good explanations for a range of users requires an explanation component to make use
of explicit user models.
To produce a relevant explanation, the explanation component must have knowledge of the
user's goals and preferences. Not only must the system know the user's immediate goals, but also
his higher goals and preferences, and his intended plan for accomplishing those goals. A relevant
explanation may need to provide information to help a user achieve a higher goal or goals, or to
correct the user's plan when it is faulty. Much work has been done in this area to identify what
information about the user's plans and goals are needed, and how that information can be used to
produce cooperative responses relevant to the user's situation [2, 27, 61.
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The convincingness of a justification depends on the soundness of the argument presented, and
the likelihood that the user will accept the justification. The soundness of the argument itself is
independent of the user, but whether he will accept the argument is another matter. To produce a
convincing justification, then, the system must consider whether the user believes the premises of
the justification, and whether he considers the inferences made (or even the form of argument) valid.
Thus, a robust model of the user's beliefs will be needed to help generate acceptable justifications.
Producing an explanation that the user will find understandable also requires knowledge of the
user's beliefs about the domain. Here the user model is needed primarily to determine the familiarity
of the user with the system domain. In this case, the explanation component needs to know the
concepts and properties the user knows about, the terms he understands, and the relationships
between entities, such as the relationship between reasoning steps that the user performs.
A deeper model of the user may also be required to estimate the user's ability t o process
the information communicated in the explanation. A psychological model of the user's ability to
make inferences from the system's statements, or to fill in omitted reasoning steps can be useful
in determining how to organize an explanation and in deciding how much information t o include
explicitly.
In summary, individualized models of the user are important, even necessary, to generate good
explanations when system users vary in their goals and domain knowledge. In the remainder of
this paper we will illustrate how a user model may be used when tailoring explanations in an
investment advisory system. Section 6 presents work we have done on acquiring models of users'
beliefs. Section 7 illustrates how such models can be acquired from a user-system dialog, and how
the information about user beliefs acquired in this way enables an explanation component to tailor
its explanations to individual users so they are more understandable.

6

Acquiring User Beliefs for Explaining

Using a detailed model of users' beliefs to support the generation of expert system explanations
has previously appeared impractical, due to the difficulty in acquiring such a model. Techniques
that emphasize explicit pre-encoding of user models (such as stereotypes [29]) are tedious, errorprone, and may potentially require more time to build than the domain knowledge base itself,
due to the number of separate models necessary. On the other hand, acquiring the information
from the user, either explicitly or implicitly, has not seemed feasible. Explicitly asking the user
about his knowledge of the domain (as in the UMFE system [33]) can be very time consuming and
potentially fraught with error due to the user's own misconceptions about what he knows, while
implicit acquisition techniques have been viewed as either too slow to build a robust model or too
unreliable in the conclusions they make.
Our current research [16, 191 indicates that this user model acquisition bottleneck can be overcome. The solution centers on a set of implicit acquisition rules that make reasonable inferences
about a user's beliefs, based on the interaction between the system and the user, the system's
knowledge base, and the existing model of the user. These rules were developed after study of an
extensive collection of transcripts of conversations between advice-seekers and a human expert,6
and have been implemented in the General User Model Acquisition Component, or GUMAC.
'The transcripts were made by Martha Pollack and Julia Hirschberg from the radio talk show "Harry Gross:
Speaking about Your Money" broadcast on station WCAU in Philadelphia, February 1-5, 1982.
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Figure 1: Sources of Knowledge for Implicit User Model Acquisition

6.1

The GUMAC System

GUMAC works in a cooperative advisory situation, where a user comes t o the system seeking advice
about a problem, and both the user and the system cooperate in solving that problem. Figure 1
illustrates the role GUMAC plays in an interactive system. The user interacts with an underlying
application (the advisory expert system) through a user interface. The user modelling module (of
which GUMAC is the model acquisition component) has access to the interface and the domain
knowledge base and uses these t o build the user model. GUMAC has been implemented in the
context of an investment advising system, but the acquisition techniques are not limited t o this
domain. In fact, the rules make no assumptions about the domain knowledge, but instead depend
on the type of interaction, i.e. a cooperative advisory interaction. The domain independence of
these rules lends support to the feasibility of building a general user modelling system, as proposed
by Finin [12].
The interface is assumed t o have a natural language parser and semantic interpreter that produce
an intermediate meaning representation language (MRL). In our implementation this component
has been simulated by hand-translating English sentences into a LUNAR-style MRL [42].7 GUMAC
uses this intermediate representation as the basis for its reasoning about statements made by both
the user and the system.
The user models built by GUMAC can be viewed as individual knowledge bases containing each
user's beliefs. These user models may be queried by other components of the system, such as the
application or the interface, to obtain yes/no answers about individual user's belief^.^ GUMAC
7We are making no special assumptions about the capability of the parser and semantic interpreter beyond the
capabilities of current systems. The parser and semantic interpreter are not actually present in our test system
because of the implementation time required.
'This is the simplest use for the user model. More sophisticated uses for user models, such as using the model
to simulate the user, are possible and have been explored (See, for example, Wahlster and Kobsa's discussion of
anticipation feedback loops in generating anaphoric responses [38].) Likewise, the responses given to queries about
user beliefs can be more sophisticated as well, providing degree of belief measures or justifications for the beliefs held
in the user model, instead of a simple yes/no answer.
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(DEFCONCEPT stock
(SPECIALIZES equity)
(SPECIALIZES market-traded-security)
(SPECIALIZES corporate-security)
(ROLE market (VR stock-market))
(ROLE own (VR corporation))
(ROLE issuer (VR corporation))
(ROLE par-value (VR dollar-amount))
(ROLE dividend (VR quant-val-measure)))
Figure 2: A NIKL definition for the concept of stock. The "specializes" clauses express the fact
that a stock is a kind of equity, market-traded-security, and a corporate-security; anything true of
these concepts is true of stock as well. "VR" stands for the value restriction of a role.

is designed t o acquire knowledge of what the user knows about the system's domain knowledge.
Thus, the user models built by GUMAC can be thought of as overlay models [7], in that entities
(such as concepts, properties, or actions) in the user model will always be a subset of those in the
domain model of the application system. However, the user models GUMAC builds can represent
different relations between these entities, so the user models are not strictly subsets of the domain
model.
The domain knowledge is represented using EES, the Explanable Expert System [24], and
consists of two types: definitional knowledge about the entities in the domain, and strategic (or
reasoning) knowledge about how to solve problems in the domain. The definitional knowledge is
represented in NIKL [23], a semantic network similar to the taxonomic component of KL-ONE
[4]. NIKL has two types of entities: concepts (such as stock or equity), which can be expressed as
l-place predicates in a first-order logic, and roles representing relations between concepts (such as
owner or interest-rate), which can be expressed as two place predicates. An example of a NIKL
definition for the stock concept is illustrated in figure 2. GUMAC makes user model assertions
about the user's knowledge of concepts, roles, whether roles apply t o particular concepts, and the
specialization relations between concepts.
The strategic knowledge in EES is represented using a goal and plan hierarchy. A plan consists
of a capability description of the action it can accomplish and a method consisting of a sequence of
steps t o be performed t o accomplish the capability description. To build an expert system in EES,
the system designer writes a set of plans, provides a top level goal to be accomplished, then invokes
an automatic program writer. The program writer examines the top level goal, finds plans capable
of accomplishing this goal, selects one, instantiates it, then posts the steps in the plans's method
as subgoals and recursively tries t o find plans t o accomplish them. The result of this process is
a goal refinement structure representing the system's reasoning method t o achieve the top level
goal. GUMAC makes assertions to the user model about the user's beliefs about the goal-subgoal
relations between actions in this hierarchy and the user's knowledge of the actions themselves.
6.2

The Acquisition Rules

Implicit acquisition of user models is feasible because of the structure of human communication
and reasoning. The fact that a particular type of conversation is being held provides constraints
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on the expected behavior of the conversation participants that can serve as a basis for inferring an
individual's beliefs during the conversation. Likewise, the fact that an individual is human creates
expectations about how he reasons and, thus, the beliefs he holds.
The acquisition rules are reasonable inference rules, but they can make mistakes. The goal is
not t o produce certain knowledge about the user, but rather the assumptions that a reasonable
conversational participant would make about the user in the same situation. Thus, the acquisition
rules can be viewed as default rules in a default logic [28]: they draw conclusions that are reasonable
t o believe unless information t o the contrary is encountered.
One important set of user model acquistion rules are the communication rules, based on Grice's
maxims for cooperative communication [14]. Grice has proposed these maxims as a way of describing the behavior of cooperative conversational participants. By assuming that users are cooperating
with the system: the communication rules make inferences about user beliefs based on these maxims.

Direct Statement Rule The direct statement rule is based on the maxim of quality ("Only say
that which you believe to be true"), and can be expressed as:
coop-agent(User) A tell(User, System, P)

-

believe(User, P).

Here, P will be a logical form expressing the content of the user's statement in the intermediate
MRL. In itself this is not too useful, so the expression is decomposed into a set of assertions
about the user's beliefs about domain concepts, roles, and their relations. Figure 3 illustrates a
sample user statement and the associated MRL for that statement. The "saying" portion of this
MRL expression will be asserted as a user belief, along with a list of assertions about the user's
knowledge of domain entities, some of which are illustrated in figure 4. Note that an assertion
such as "bel(U, concept(T-Bill))" does not mean the user knows all about T-Bills, only that he has
some knowledge of the concept. Other assertions, such as "bel(User, role(T-Bill, interest-rate)),"
are necessary t o indicate the aspects of U's knowledge of T-Bills.

Relevancy Rule The relevancy rule, based on Grice's maxim of relation, draws conclusions
about the user's beliefs about the strategic knowledge of the domain. This rule presumes that since
the user is cooperating, his contributions will be relevant t o the current conversational goal. In
terms of the EES representation, this means the user believes his action is a step (or subgoal) in
achieving the system's current goal. The relevancy rule can be expressed as follows:
coop-agent(User) A tell(User, System, P ) A current-goal(System, G)
bel(User, subgoal(tell(User, System, P), G)).

-

In practice, the system's current goal is easy to determine from the goal refinement structure
produced by the EES automatic program writer. Furthermore, this goal can be assumed to be a
mutual belief held by the user and system, since the system will explicitly state its goal by asking a
question, such as "what is your yearly income?"10 The relevancy rule provides an example of how
the acquisition rules can make conclusions that are not strictly a subset of the system's domain
model. For example, if the current goal is t o determine the user's yearly income, and the user
provides information about his property tax payments, the relevancy rule will conclude that the
user believes property tax information is needed t o determine income, when the system knows it is
not.
'This is a reasonable assumption, since the user has come to the system to receive advice.
''In fact, another acquisition rule concludes that if the system asks a question, then the user believes that the goal
associated with that question is the current goal.
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User: "I have a $10,000 T-Bill at 7-112% interest."
(FOR THE t l / tell
: (speaker t l User)
: (addressee t l System)
: (saying t l
(FOR THE t b l / treasury-bill
: (interest-rate t b l
(FOR THE p c t l / percentage
: (measurement-unit p c t l number)
: (value p c t l 7.5)))
: (face-value t b l
(FOR THE d l / dollar-amount
: (measurement-unit d l dollar)
: (value d l 10000)))
; (owned-by t b l User)))))
Figure 3: A User Statement and Associated MRL

bel(User, concept(interest-rate)
bel(User , concept (face-value)
bel(User, concept(interest-rate-domain)
bel(User , concept (face-value-domain)
bel(User , concept (percentage)
bel(User, concept (dollar)
bel(User, concept(treasury-bill)
bel(User , concept (number)

role(treasury-bill, interest-rate)
role(treasury-bill, face-value)
role(interest-rate-domain, interest-rate)
role(face-value-domain, face-value)
bel(User, concept(interest-rate-range)
bel(User, concept (face-value-range)
bel(User, isa(treasury-bill, interest-rate-domain)
bel(User, isa(treasury-bill, face-value-domain)

Figure 4: Assertions Made by the Direct Statement Rule
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Sufficiency Rule A third communication rule, the sufficiency rule, is based on the maxim of
quantity, which states "make your contribution as informative as necessary, but not more SO.)) The
sufficiency rule deals with the situation where the system knows that a certain action must be
performed by the user t o accomplish the current goal, but the user fails to perform that action.
In this case, there are several possibilities: (1) the user doesn't know that current goal, (2) the
user doesn't believe the action is relevant t o the goal, (3) the user believes the system can achieve
the goal without the action being performed, or (4) the user does not believe he can perform the
action. This can expressed as follows:

Other Rules Other implicit acquisition rules reason on the knowledge base and the current user
model. Such rules include transitivity rules for goals and concepts, the inheritance rule, and a
generalization rule for concepts:
A bel(User, isa(B, C))
bel(User, isa(A, B))
bel(User, subgoal(G1, G2)) A bel(User, subgoal(G2, G3))
A bel(User, role(B, R))
bel(User, isa(A, B))
bel(User , concep t(A)
A bel(User, concept(B))
bel(System, concept(D))
bel(System, isa(B, D))
bel(User, concept (D)
bel(User, isa(B, D))

--+bel(User, isa(A, C))
+ bel(User,

subgoal(G1, G3))

+ bel(User, role(A, R))
A
bel(User, concept (C))

A
A
A
A

bel(System, isa(A, D))
bel(System, isa(C, D))
bel(User, isa(A, D))
bel(User, isa(C, D)).

A
A

-

A

A similar generalization rule exists for goals, but is difficult to express in a simple logical notation.
Essentially, if the user knows all the plan steps where he is an agent, then the goal generalization
rule will conclude that the user knows the goal the plan is capable of achieving.
During the course of a user-system dialog, these user model acquisition rules make a large
number of assertions about the user's beliefs about the system's domain. At the end of this dialog,
GUMAC has built a robust model of the user's domain knowledge with respect t o the topics
discussed in the dialog. This model will contain few assertions of user's beliefs beyond the discourse
topics of the dialog, but the model built is sufficient to support the tailoring of explanations t o
individual users. Examples of how a model is built by the acquisition rules and used t o tailor
explanations are presented in the next section.

7

An Extended Example

This section illustrates how a user model may be acquired from an on-going dialogue, and how
that model can be used t o tailor explanations so they are more understandable. To this end, the
interaction of two users with an investment advisory system is presented. Each user has the same
goal for using the system, and is in the same financial situation, so the system's recommendation will
be the same in each case, and for the same reasons. The users differ, however, in their knowledge
about the investment domain. These differences are evident in the way they interact with the
system, causing the acquisition rules to construct different models for each user, and suggesting
that the explanations given to each user should differ.
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Goal:
recommend(Systeni, User, invest(User, Security))
Method: 1) determine(System, acceptable-risk(User)) ---t AR
2) determine(System, required-income(User)) --t RI
RL
3) determine(System, required-liquidity(User))
4) choose-security(System, AR, RI, RL)
Sec
5) tell(System, User, invest(User, Sec))

--

Figure 5: Recommend Investment Plan

In this scenario, each user wants t o know how to invest $10,000 he now has in a savings account.
The top level goal of the investment advisor (represented in EES) is for the system t o recommend
t o the user that he invest in a particular security, accomplished by the RECOMMEND-INVESTMENT
plan, illustrated in figure 5. Much of the user-system interaction focuses on determining the user's
income, obligations, and current investments in order to determine the user's income and liquidity
requirements, and the degree of risk he can accept in his investments. The system then compares
these constraints with its knowledge of potential investment securities to select the most appropriate
security to recommend.

A Knowledgeable User
The first dialogue proceeds as follows:
(1) U1: Could you recommend how I should invest $10,000 I have in my
savings account?

,//'

S: What are your current investments? \\ I
(2)
(3) U1: 1 have a $40,000 6-month CD
8% inter st,
a $10,000 T-Bill a t 7$% interesb,
200 shares of AT&T which I bought at 32,
$14,000 in a savings account,
and $1000 in checking.

$

(4)

J

S: What is your yearly income?

(5) U1: I earn $35,000 and my wife makes $15,000, plus we get $5000 from
our investments.
S: What obligations do you have?
(6)
(7) U1: I pay $300 on a car loan and $900 on my home loan.
(8)

I have no dependents.

At this point the system has sufficient information t o make the recommendation that the user
should invest in growth stocks.ll Furthermore, the model acquisition rules have built a substantial
model of the user's beliefs about investing, portions of which are illustrated in figures 6 and 7.
l l ~ h investment
e
advisory system we are using has limited domain knowledge, so the interaction stops at this
point. A more robust system would probably require a longer dialogue in order to gather the necessary information
to make a decision. We feel this would enhance the effectiveness of the user model acquisition component, since i t
would have more information to work from.

7 A N EXTENDED EXAMPLE

Figure 6: A Model of Ul's Knowledge of Investment Securities
Concepts and Roles U1 is believed to know are shown in gray, with an associated rule indicating
why the user is believed t o know it. "DS" stands for the direct statement rule, while "CG" indicates
the concept generalization rule was used.
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Figure 7: A Model of U17s Knowledge of Property Dependencies
Properties U1 is believed to know are shown in gray. Associated with each property or relation U1
is believed to know is the rule that asserted the conclusion. "DS" stands for the direct statement
rule, "R" for the relevancy rule, and "Gen" for the goal generalization rule.
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Goal:
determine(System, yearly-income(User))
Method: 1) askref(System, User, yearly-income(User))
2) determine(System, employment-income(User))
EI
3) determine(System, retirement-income(User))
RI
4) determine(System, spouse's-income(User))
SI
5) determine(System, investment-income(User))
I1
6) add(System, EI, RI, SI, 11)
YI

-

-

--

Figure 8: Determine Yearly Income Plan

Figure 6 depicts a small portion of the definitional knowledge represented in the NIKL semantic
network. In answering the system's questions U1 has made several direct statements about his
financial situation. From these statements the direct statement infers that U1 believes what he has
said, and thus knows about concepts such as SAVINGS-ACCOUNT
and INTEREST-RATE.
Building
on these assertions, the concept generalization rule can infer Ul's knowledge of more abstract
concepts, such as inferring Ul's knowledge of BANK-SECURITIES
from his knowledge of SAVINGSACCOUNT,
CHECKING-ACCOUNT,
and CERTIFICATE-OF-DEPOSIT.
Furthermore, the transitivity and
inheritance rules have made a large number of inferences about concept properties and subsumption
relations that are not explicitly depicted in the figure.
Figure 7 illustrates a portion of the investment advisor's reasoning structure. In this domain,
the system can be viewed as performing a series of actions t o determine information. This figure
is a graph showing some of the pieces of information the system must determine. For example,
t o determine the user's yearly income, the system needs t o determine the user's employment and
retirement income, his spouse's income, and his income from current investments. In EES, this
is represented as the six-step plan illustrated in figure 8. Only the plan steps that involve user
action are illustrated in figure 7. In this dialogue, when U1 was asked about his yearly income and
obligations, he provided a large amount of information that satisfied the subgoal requirements of the
DETERMINE-YEARLY-INCOME
and DETERMINE-OBLIGATIONS
plans. The relevancy rule has made
assertions reflecting this, since Ul's action of telling the system this information (such as telling the
system his investment income) achieves the "determine" goals (such as DETERMINE-INVESTMENTINCOME).These assertions indicate that the user knows how yearly-income and obligations are
determined. Furthermore, this knowledge enables the goal generalization rule t o reason further
that U1 knows how REQUIRED-INCOME,
ACCEPTABLE-RISK,
and so on are determined.
After this dialogue, the system makes its recommendation "You should invest in growth stocks,"
t o which U1 may ask "Why?" This question may be answered in many ways, but for this example
we will assume that a standard type of expert system explanation is given-a description of the
steps the system took t o reach this conclusion. The user model that has been acquired is now useful
in applying the familiarity criteria to determine what information to include in the explanation.
To be successful, an explanation should be grounded in the user's own knowledge of the domain, a
requirement that affects how deeply the explanation must delve into the system's goal refinement
structure before reaching actions and terms the user knows. In fact, if the explanation component
assumes the user has no knowledge of the domain beyond that directly evidenced in his statements,
the explanation may include the majority of this refinement structure.
From the dialogue the relevancy and goal generalization rules have inferred that the user knows
a lot about the system's reasoning, so a large portion of the refinement structure can be omitted
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from the explanation. In fact, starting from the top level RECOMMEND-INVESTMENT
plan presented
in figure 5, the system does not need to explain how it determined REQUIRED-INCOME,
REQUIREDLIQUIDITY, and ACCEPTABLE-RISK
because the user model indicates that U1 knows this already.
Thus, the explanation only needs to concentrate on the CHOOSE-SECURITY
step. Following is an
example of the type of explanation the system could produce for U1:
S: To recommend an investment, I choose a security that maximizes return on investment,
while satisfying your income, liquidity, and risk needs. Since you can accept high risk, debt
securities (such as bank securities or government-issued securities like T-Bills) are ruled out,
so you should invest in an equity. Real estate is not appreciating well presently, so stock
would be a good investment. Since you can accept a fair amount of risk, I recommend stock
with a high potential for return, such as stock in growth-oriented companies.
In addition to deciding how much explanation to give, the system must consider how to express that
information; the user model can help here as well. Notice that in the explanation above the term
"debt security" is introduced with examples of types of debt securities. The user model contains
no assertions that the user knows what a debt security is, so the explanation generator tries to
introduce the term with respect to concepts that the user model indicates he does know about,
such as bank securities. That is not sufficient, so it also says that government securities are types
of debt securities, giving a partial definition for this term and an example of a government security
that the user knows about.
Although an explanation generation component is not included in the GUMAC implementation,
the capabilities assumed are not unreasonable. Weiner's BLAH system [41] used a similar approach
to generate explanations, using a user model to decide what reasoning steps to include. Moore and
Paris [22] are currently implementing a plan-based explanation generator for the EES system that
reasons about the user's knowledge state to control the generation process. It should require little
work t o integrate GUMAC with their system.

A Novice User
The dialogue with a novice investor is significantly different. Where the knowledgeable user volunteered relevant information when a question was asked, the novice does not know what information
is relevant (or does not know the information at all), hence, the system must ask further questions
t o elicit this information from him. For example, where U1 volunteered information about his wife's
income and dependents, in the following conversation the system must ask several questions to get
this information from U2.
S: What is your yearly income?
(9)
(10) U2: I earn $35,000.
(11)

S: Are you married?

(12) U2: Yes.

(13) S: Does your spouse work?
(14) U2: Yes.
(15) S: What is her income?
(16) U2: She makes $15,000.
(17)

S: Do you have any dependents?
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Figure 9: A Model of U2's Knowledge of Property Dependencies
Properties U2 is believed t o know are shown in gray. Properties and relations U2 is believed t o
not know are shown with hatching. Associated with each property or relation U2 is believed t o
know is the rule that asserted the conclusion. "DS" stands for the direct statement rule, "R" for
the relevancy rule, and "S" for the sufficiency rule.

(18) U2: No.

(19) S: Are you making any loan payments?
(20) U2: I pay $300 on a car loan and $900 on my home loan.
The portion of the user model built for U2, illustrated in figure 9, together with the comparable
model for U1 in figure 7 indicates the significant differences between the models built for each user.
An explanation for U2 will require much more detail. To explain the rationale for its recommendation, the system will need to give a detailed account of how it determined the user's income,
liquidity, and risk requirements, in addition t o explaining how it chose t o recommend growth stocks.
In fact, the explanation would be most effective if given in pieces, so that the system could check
that the user understands what has been said a t each step. An example of one portion of an
explanation for U2, concerning his income needs, is illustrated below.
S: Since you don't have substantial loans, and you have no dependents, you don't have many
financial obligations t o meet (things you will need t o pay for). Furthermore, your yearly income from your job and your wife's, and from your current investments is more than sufficient
to meet those obligations, so your future investments don't need to produce regular income
(such as interest payments).
Here, to explain how R E Q U I R E D - I N C O M E was determined, the system first explains how OBLIGAand YEARLY-INCOME
were determined, grounding the explanation in the simple steps U2
knows about.
TIONS
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Discussion
A model of a user's knowledge and beliefs can significantly affect the explanations generated by
an expert system. In the previous example, users at two extremes of knowledge about the domain
were chosen t o illustrate the types of explanations that might be generated if knowledge about
the user is available. How does this compare t o systems that have a fixed method for generating
explanations (or a fixed set of assumptions about the user)? Such systems always generate the
same explanation regardless of the user. If the system assumed that all users are knowledgeable
about investments, then U2 would receive an explanation similar to that generated for U 1 in the
example. Such a terse explanation, using terms U2 did not understand and omitting reasoning
steps necessary for him to follow the justification would not be understandable.
On the other hand, if the system assumed all users were novices, then U 1 would receive an
explanation similar to that given t o U2. In this case, U 1 would probably understand the explanation
(although the length of the explanation might cause U1 t o skip the explanation or only read portions
of it), but the same understanding could be achieved with a much simpler explanation. In this case,
the explanation given U 1 fails to be good because it is too long and complex.
In most situations, actual users will fall somewhere between the extremes used in this example
(although the descriptions of the knowledge of U 1 and U2 are reasonable). Yet, even if the system
chooses a generic model for some "average" user, if there is significant variability among users
(which is the case for many domains, such as investment advising), then explanations based on
this generic model of the user will frequently fail t o be as good as they could be. Thus, a model
of the user's beliefs is an important component to generating good explanations, and the implicit
acquisition technique we have presented makes it practical t o include such models in an expert
system.

8

Conclusions

An explanation facility is an important component of an expert system, perhaps the most important
component. Thus, the quality of a system's explanations will significantly affect its acceptability
and effectiveness. This paper has explored the nature of explanation, the components of a good
explanation, and argued that frequently systems will need t o tailor explanations t o individual users
and thus need a model of those users' beliefs. Furthermore, it is practical t o acquire such user
model implicitly, a method that greatly reduces the effort required to incorporate user models into
explanation systems.
The user model acquisition method described in this paper has been purposely restricted t o only
implicit techniques t o demonstrate the power and feasibility of such an approach. This approach
is probably too extreme for practical systems, however. In the GUMAC system, no explicitly
acquired information is kept about the user-when a new user is encountered, the model describing
his beliefs is a blank slate. For a practical system a combination of implicit and explicit acquisition
would be more effective. If the user model is to be used t o help determine system behavior during
the dialogue, an initial, explicitly acquired model would be useful t o support the first portions of
the conversation. Then, as the dialogue proceeds, the implicit acquisition rules will progressively
refine this initial model to correspond t o the specific user. Such a method would still minimize
the explicit acquisition required, since the initial model could be a generic model describing the
"average" system user.''
12See [17] a discussion of how stereotypic user models can be integrated with implicit acquisition methods in a
general user modelling system.
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This work suggests several possible directions for studying the role of user modelling in expert
system explanation. First, the classification of good explanation given in section 4 is just an initial
attempt t o characterize an area that is not well understood. More work is needed to discover what
makes an explanation good-this work will contribute greatly to the effectiveness of future expert
systems. A study of the types of knowledge about the user needed for explanation generation
is a second area for further research. Section 5 provided a general catagorization of these types,
but t o actually generate good explanations, these categories must be defined in detail. A related
research area is t o study how an explanation facility uses a user model. This study could lead
t o an understanding of what general services a user model should be expected to provide t o the
system components that use it. A fourth, very important need is t o develop a measure or measures
of the quality of an explanation. Currently, two explanations cannot be objectively compared to
determine which is better. Finally, the work on acquiring a user model described in section 6 is
quite limited in the types of information it can acquire, and the types of interactions from which
it can acquire that information. To extend the explanation capabilities of an expert system, user
model acquisition capabilities must be extended as well.
Expert system explanation and user modelling are both relatively new fields of study. This
paper has demonstrated the importance of user modelling for explanation, and provides examples
of how t o acquire and use such information t o improve the understandability of explanations.
Furthermore, this work suggests many areas for further research, research that should result in
substantial improvements in the explanations produced by expert systems.
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